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21 JAN 1975

Mr. Frank A. Lindsay
President
Itek Corporation
10 Maguire Road
Lexington, Massachusetts 02173

Dear Frank:

Thank you very much for your thoughtfulness in sending along a copy of your note to Dick with Raymond Aron's comments about CIA's analyses during the Vietnam War. It is indeed an encouraging account, and I think essentially accurate. These days any good comment about CIA is of course both useful and deeply appreciated.

Thanks again.

Sincerely,

16/Biel

W. E. Colby
Director

WEC:jlp (21 Jan 75)

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FRANKLIN A. LINDSAY PRESIDENT


January 8, 1975

The Honorable William Colby
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:

I have sent the enclosed letter to Dick Helms to be sure he has seen Raymond Aron's tribute to the accuracy of the CIA analyses during the Viet Nam war. I thought you would also like to see a copy of Aron's statement if it has not already come to your attention.

Warm regards,



FAL:njc
Encl.

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FRANKLIN A. LINDSAY PRESIDENT

January 8, 1975

Ambassador Richard Helms
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Dick:

At a time in which the CIA is under fire it is particularly important for you to remember the very important achievements of the CIA during your tenure there. You may or may not have read Raymond Aron's new book, The Imperial Republic. In case you haven't, you should take great personal pride and satisfaction in the tribute he pays to the CIA for the accuracy of the CIA's political analyses during the period of expanding American involvement in Viet Nam. On page 105 and 106, he has the following to say:

"Equally striking is the contrast between the accuracy of the analyses supplied by the intelligence services, especially the CIA, and the frequent errors of the civilian advisers, especially the academics. The CIA had foreseen that the bombing would harden the North Vietnamese leaders' will and would not prevent infiltration, and that increased aid to the North would be the response to any reinforcement of the American forces. President Johnson, before starting the air strikes, had transmitted a threatening message, virtually an ultimatum, through the Canadian member of the International Control Commission. This attempt at "compellence" had met with an inflexible determination, which the intelligence experts, unlike the armchair theoreticians, had appraised at its true worth, and whose

Ambassador Richard Helms

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implications it had accurately predicted. Similarly, these experts had repeated over and over again to unheeding presidents and their advisers that the roots of the war and the key to success - assuming there was a key - lay in the South, not the North, or in other words, that it was essential for the United States to establish a government in Saigon capable of winning popular support and installing in the South Vietnamese a will to independence against the Communist North."

Warm regards,



FAL:njc